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OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR A FUND MANAGER, WITH CAPITAL
INJECTIONS AND ENDOGENOUS TRADING CONSTRAINTS
SERGEY NADTOCHIY AND THALEIA ZARIPHOPOULOU
ABSTRACT. In this paper, we construct a solution to the optimal contract problem for dele-
gated portfolio management of the fist-best (risk-sharing) type. The novelty of our result is (i)
in the robustness of the optimal contract with respect to perturbations of the wealth process
(interpreted as capital injections), and (ii) in the more general form of principal’s objective
function, which is allowed to depend directly on the agent’s strategy, as opposed to being a
function of the generated wealth only. In particular, the latter feature allows us to incorporate
endogenous trading constraints in the contract. We reduce the optimal contract problem to
the following inverse problem: for a given portfolio (defined in a feedback form, as a random
field), construct a stochastic utility whose optimal portfolio coincides with the given one. We
characterize the solution to this problem through a Stochastic Partial Differential Equation
(SPDE), prove its well-posedness, and compute the solution explicitly in the Black-Scholes
model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Herein, we study a problem of delegated portfolio management, in which an investor hires
a fund manager (referred to as the agent) for a specified period of time, to invest her capital
dynamically in the available assets. At the end of the time period, the investor receives the
wealth generated by the manager and, in return, pays the fees prescribed by the contract.
These fees are allowed to depend on the wealth level and on other publicly observed market
indicators (e.g. on the prices of available assets). As the investor can deduce the agent’s
strategy from the generated wealth process and the publicly observed market indicators, the
associated optimal contract problems is of the so-called “first-best” type, also known as the
optimal risk-sharing problem.
The existing literature on the optimal contract design for the delegated portfolio manage-
ment problem, of the first-best type, includes [13], [14], [10], [2], and the references therein.1
Single period models are analyzed in [13] and [14], while [10] considers the Black-Scholes-
Merton model, with the investor and the fund manager having either exponential or power
Date: February 22, 2018 .
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1Herein, we limit our literature review to the papers that are dealing with the delegated portfolio management
problem specifically, leaving aside the discussion of general optimal contract theory, such as the seminal work
[3].
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utilities. A general market model and general utilities are considered in [2], which, in partic-
ular, constructs an optimal contract explicitly when the market is complete.
The present work differs from the existing results in that, herein, (i) we require that the
contract is robust with respect to the perturbations of wealth process, and (ii) we consider a
more general optimality criterion for a contract than the classical expected utility of terminal
wealth. Our main motivation to consider the perturbations of wealth process is to include (un-
unticipated) capital injections made by the investor after the contract is initiated. Namely,
we assume that the contract allows the investor (as, e.g., most fee structures of mutual funds
do) to add an arbitrary amount of additional capital to her account with the manager, at any
time when she wishes to do so, and with the fee structure for the manager remaining the
same (i.e. the contract remains the same). Note that these times and amounts, and even their
probabilistic structure, may not be initially known to either one of the two parties. However,
the inflow of capital in the fund may change the investment strategy of the fund manager
drastically (see, e.g. [1], and the references therein, for more on the effects of capital inflows
and outflows on the behavior of a fund manager). Thus, when designing an optimal contract,
one needs to take into account the agent’s optimal strategy, induced by this contract, for
any intermediate time and wealth level. Mathematically, this means that the agent’s strategy
should be viewed as a random field, defined for all possible initial investment times and
wealth levels.
Another special feature of our setting is the more general optimality criterion for a con-
tract. Namely, we assume that the entity designing the contract (referred to as the principal)
may be concerned directly with the strategy used by the agent, in addition to the wealth
generated by this strategy.2 Our main motivating example of such preference structure is the
case of constrained maximization of expected utility of terminal wealth, with the constraint
that no investment is made in certain assets. In such a case, the principal’s objective contains
an infinite penalty for investing in the prohibited assets, and the contract must be designed so
that the agent follows this rule. For example, a regulator or the board of directors of a mutual
fund may want to enforce a ban on investments in certain “socially irresponsible” assets, or
in the assets of companies subject to sanctions (we refer the reader to [12], and the refer-
ence therein, for more on the so called “socially responsible” funds). However, the principal
cannot put such a rule into a contract directly, as she does not observe the agent’s actions.
Hence, these constraints need to be enforced implicitly, through the design of the contract,
which can only depend on the generated wealth and on the publicly observed factors – this
is what we refer to as the endogenous constraints.
Let us describe a specific setting in which the robustness of the contract with respect to
capital injections and the endogenous constraints are important (a more detailed formulation
is given in Section 4). First, we assume that the principal, who designs the contract, may
not coincide with the investor (at least, they may not coincide for the entire duration of the
contract). For example, the fee structure of a mutual fund is very often prescribed a priori,
2As explained in the next paragraph, the investor may not coincide with the principal, in our setting.
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and an individual investor can either take it or leave it.3 In this case, the principal may be
a regulator or the board of directors of the mutual fund.4 Even though the principal may
not coincide with the investor, we assume that she aims to design the contract so that the
investor is satisfied: e.g. the board of directors of a mutual fund wants to keep their investors
happy, in order not to lose them to the competitors. At the same time, the principal also
wants to ensure that the agent does not invest in the prohibited assets. Thus, the principal
finds a strategy that maximizes the investor’s expected utility of terminal wealth, subject
to the constraint that no investment is made in the prohibited assets, and aims to design
a contract (which is only allowed to depend on the generated wealth and on the publicly
observable market factors) which would make this strategy optimal for the agent. This task
is complicated by the fact that the agent may perform capital injections, whose times and
sizes are unknown (i.e. not modeled) initially. Namely, the investor, unlike the principal,
may not be concerned about investing in prohibited assets, hence, she may perform a capital
injection even if it encourages the agent to violate this constraint. Thus, the contract has to
be chosen by the principal so that the agent has no incentive to violate the constraint even in
the presence of capital injections – this is what we refer to as the robustness with respect to
capital injections.
On the mathematical side, this paper solves the following inverse problem: given a regular
enough random field, find a stochastic utility whose optimal investment strategy, in the feed-
back form, coincides with this random field. We characterize the solution through a linear
stochastic partial differential equation (SPDE), prove its well-posedness, and compute the
solution explicitly in the Black-Scholes model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the optimal
contract problem precisely, in mathematical terms. Subsection 2.1 is concerned with the
market model, and Subsection 2.2 introduces the notions of admissible and optimal contracts.
Section 3 presents a general solution to the problem, which reduces to the inverse problem
of constructing an optimization criterion that generates a given optimal strategy (viewed
as a random field), for all initial wealth levels. Proposition 1 connects this problem to a
nonlinear SPDE, and Proposition 2 shows how to linearize this SPDE and proves the well-
posedness of the resulting equation. Finally, Theorem 1 connects these results to the optimal
contract problem. In Section 4, we consider a specific setting in which the proposed notion
of optimal contract is natural, and use the general results of preceding sections to construct
an optimal contract in closed form, in the Black-Scholes model. Remarkably, the optimal
3The examples of cases where a contract is not fully designed by the party that initiates it are numerous.
For example, a lease agreement for a residential property is often standardized, according to the local laws,
and it may be rather costly for an individual to design a new contract. In addition, the laws may require that
certain conditions are present in the contract or may prohibit certain conditions: e.g. giving the lessee the right
to terminate the agreement.
4Alternatively, the principal may be an initial investor, who enters into a long-term contract with the fund
manager and passes on her wealth to the successors. The successors cannot withdraw funds before the deadline,
but they may be allowed to add capital, keeping the fee structure as prescribed by the principal.
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contract constructed in Section 4 depends only on the values of the wealth process and of
the tradable assets at the terminal time. Hence, it also provides a solution to the second-best
(moral hazard) version of the problem, in which the principal only observes the terminal
values of the wealth and of the market and, hence, cannot fully deduce the agent’s strategy
from her observations.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1. Market model and investment strategies. We fix a stochastic basis (Ω,F,P) and as-
sume that the publicly observed filtration F (also referred to as the market filtration) is an
augmentation of the filtration generated by W , a standard Brownian motion in Rd. In addi-
tion, we assume that the price process of traded assets S = (S1, . . . , Sk)T is an Itoˆ process
in Rk with positive entries, given by
(1) d logSt = µ˜tdt+ σTt dWt,
where the logarithm is taken entry-wise, µ˜ is a locally integrable stochastic process with
values in Rk, and σ is a d× k matrix of locally square integrable processes, with d ≥ k, and
with linearly independent columns. The latter assumptions is interpreted as the absence of
redundant assets. We use the notation ”AT ” to denote the transpose of a matrix (vector) A.
For simplicity, we set the riskless interest rate to zero (equivalently, we work with discounted
units). We introduce the d-dimensional stochastic process λ, frequently called the market
price of risk, via
(2) λt :=
(
σTt
)+
µt,
where (σTt )
+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of the matrix σTt , and µ is the drift of S:
µit = µ˜
i
t + ‖σit‖2/2, for i = 1, . . . , k, with σit being the i-th column of σt. In particular,
we have σTt λt = µt. The existence of such a process λ follows from the assumption of
absence of arbitrage in the model. Denote by X a set of pairs (ξ, τ), with τ ∈ T and
ξ ∈ L0+(Fτ ), where T is the set of all F-stopping times, and L0+(Fτ ) is the set of all positive
Fτ -measurable random variables. Starting from any (ξ, τ) ∈ X , the cumulative wealth
process Xpi,ξ,τ is given by
(3) dXpi,ξ,τs = pi
T
s σ
T
s λsds+ pi
T
s σ
T
s dWs, s ∈ (τ, T ], Xpi,ξ,ττ = ξ,
for any progressively measurable process pi, representing the self-financing trading strategy,
for which the above integrals are well defined. We assume that pi is such that Xpi,ξ,τ is a.s.
strictly positive at all times. For each pair (ξ, τ), we fix a subset of such strategies A(ξ, τ),
and call any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ) (ξ, τ)-admissible (or, just admissible, if the rest is clear from the
context).
Remark 1. It is possible to drop the restriction to strictly positive wealth processes. How-
ever, in this case, the assumptions on the optimal strategy pi∗ and on the initial condition U0,
made in Subsection 3.2, as well as the proof of Proposition 2, would change accordingly (cf.
Remark 7).
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2.2. Optimal contract. Consider an investor who hires an agent in order to invest her initial
capital X0 > 0 in the market described above. The agent is offered a contract, which is
represented by a measurable mapping C : Ω× (0,∞)→ R, which maps the terminal value
of a wealth process (produced by the agent, via a chosen trading strategy pi) into the payment
(received by the agent at time T ). The agent is risk-neutral, in that he aims to maximize his
expected objective:
(4) maxEC(XpiT ),
where the maximization is performed over all admissible strategies pi, with C being fixed.
The agent will not enter into a contract if his expected payment does not reach a given level
u0 > 0. We define an admissible contract as a contract for which the agent’s optimization
problem is well posed, and such that the participation constraint is satisfied.
Definition 1. We call C an admissible contract if the following holds.
• For any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ), C(Xpi,ξ,τT ) is absolutely integrable.
• There exists a progressively measurable random field pi∗ : [0, T ]×Ω× (0,∞)→ R,
s.t.:
– for any (ξ, τ) ∈ X , there exists a uniqueX∗,ξ,τ satisfying (3), with pi = pi∗(X∗,ξ,τ ),
– for any (ξ, τ) ∈ X , pi∗(X∗,ξ,τ ) ∈ A(ξ, τ),
– EC
(
X∗,X0,0T
)
≥ u0,
– for any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ),
E
(
C(Xpi,ξ,τT ) | Fτ
)
≤ E
(
C(X∗,ξ,τT ) | Fτ
)
, a.s.,
and the equality is only possible if pi = pi∗(X∗,ξ,τ ) for a.e. (t, ω) in the stochastic
interval [τ, T ].
Any such strategy pi∗ is called C-optimal.
The special feature of the above definition, which differentiates it from the classical setup,
is that the agent is allowed to re-evaluate his strategy at intermediate times, and starting from
various wealth levels, which, in particular, may not coincide with the wealth generated by
his strategy thus far. In addition, at each re-evaluation, the agent has to follow the exact
strategy prescribed by the optimal random field: i.e. the optimal strategy is time-consistent
and unique. A motivation for such strong definition of an optimal contract is given in the
discussion following Definition 2, and a specific problem is described in Section 4.
The contract is designed by a principal who aims to maximize the expectation of her
individual objective J , which maps any progressively measurable random field pi : [0, T ] ×
Ω× (0,∞)→ R into an FT -measurable random variable J(pi), applied to the strategy used
by the agent, less the payment to the agent:
(5) maxE [J(pi)− C (XpiT )] .
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The above maximization is performed over all admissible contracts C, with the strategy pi
being C-optimal.
Definition 2. An admissible contract C∗ is a solution to the optimal contract problem (4)–
(5), also referred to as an optimal contract, if, for anyC∗-optimal strategy pi∗, any admissible
contract C, and any C-optimal pi, we have
E
(
J(pi)− C
(
Xpi,X0,0T
))
≤ E
(
J(pi∗)− C∗
(
X∗,X0,0T
))
,
where Xpi,X0,0 and X∗,X0,0 are the wealth processes associated with pi and pi∗, respectively,
and with the initial condition X0 at time zero.
The main difference between the above formulation of the optimal contract problem and
the classical one is that, in the present case, the principal needs to predict the agent’s strategy
for various initial wealth levels, which may not correspond to the levels generated by the
strategy itself. The reason for such a formulation is explained in the introduction: on the one
hand, we want to allow for (positive) capital injections after the contract is initiated, on the
other hand, we do not want to impose any probabilistic structure on the times or the sizes
of these injections. In such a robust formulation, the capital under management may change
(increase) in an “unpredictable way” at any given time, which, naturally, forces the agent
to change his strategy. However, Definition 1 ensures that, even if an injection is made, the
agent’s optimal strategy is still given by the same random field (only started from a different
wealth level). Thus, in the presence of unknown capital injections, the contract can only
determine the agent’s optimal strategy as a random field. This makes it natural to define the
principal’s objective as a function of such random field. A specific example that leads to an
optimal contract problem of the present type is described in Section 4.
It is worth mentioning that, in the classical formulation of the problem, if we assume no
capital injections and view strategies as stochastic processes, with a fixed initial wealth, the
optimal contract problem typically reduces to the so-called “first best” type, which has a
trivial solution. This is due to the fact that, in a non-degenerate market, one can infer the
trading strategy from a terminal value of the wealth process (viewed as a random variable).
An example of such trivial construction is given in Subsection 4.2. However, the mapping
from wealth to strategy (viewed as a stochastic process) depends on the initial capital, hence,
the resulting, trivial, solution is not robust w.r.t. capital injections. The optimal contract
defined above (with an example constructed in Subsection 4.3) is robust w.r.t. such injections,
and it is also optimal in the classical formulation. Thus, in particular, it provides another,
non-trivial, solution to the classical problem.
It is also important that J(pi) may depend on pi in a more general way – not only through
Xpi. Otherwise, the problem becomes trivial in many cases of interest, as illustrated in Sub-
section 4.2. As discussed in the introduction, our main motivation for considering general
dependence on pi is the presence of endogenous constraints. Namely, we assume that the
principal does not want the agent to invest in certain stocks but cannot simply include it in
the contract, as the agent’s strategy is not directly observable.
OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR A FUND MANAGER 7
Remark 2. Note that we allow the principal’s individual objective, J , and the contract, C, to
be quite general. However, the principal’s total objective combines them in the additive way:
J − C. From an economic point of view, it may be more natural to include the agent’s fees
inside J , but it is not allowed by the current setting. Nevertheless, the subsequent sections
show that the optimal contract is constructed as C(x) = CT (x), where C is a sufficiently
smooth random filed, so that we can define
C(XpiT ) = C0(X0) +
∫ T
0
dCt(X
pi
t ).
As we assume no discounting (equivalently, we work with discounted units), the above rep-
resentation can be interpreted as a flow of payments from the principal to the agent. As
these payments are spread over the entire time interval [0, T ], it is possible to justify their
appearance in the additive form in the principal’s objective.
Remark 3. The assumption of risk-neutrality of the agent can be relaxed by assuming that
he maximizes the expected utility of his fees, U(C). However, in such a case, we would
either have to replace C in the principal’s objective by U(C), or the agent’s participation
constraint would have to be formulated in terms of expected fees (as opposed to expected
utility of his fees), none of which is very natural. In addition, we do not allow for a cost
of effort in the agent’s objective. These are the limitations we have to accept in order to be
able to use our solution approach. We leave the case of more general preferences and cost
structures for future research.
Remark 4. The optimal contract constructed herein is also robust w.r.t. maturity. Namely,
our method allows one to construct an entire family of optimal contracts, {CT}, for all
maturities T > 0. Thus, we also solve a slightly more general optimal contract problem (of
the so-called “third best” type), in which the agent is allowed to choose the time horizon
(when the contract is initiated), and the principal does not know which horizon the agent
prefers, hence, she offers him a menu of contracts, for all possible horizons.
Remark 5. A very desirable feature of a contract is its limited liability: i.e. the condition
C ≥ 0. Note that we do not require limited liability in the definition of admissible contract,
and our general results do not guarantee that this property is satisfied by the optimal con-
tract. However, the optimal contract constructed in Section 4 does satisfy the limited liability
condition.
3. SOLUTION
Let us outline, heuristically, the solution approach. First, we notice that, if C is an admis-
sible contract and pi∗ is C-optimal, with the associated optimal wealth X∗, the contract
(6) C˜ := C
u0
EC(X∗T )
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is also admissible, and the set of C˜-optimal strategies is the same as the set of C-optimal
strategies. In addition,
E C˜(X∗T ) = u0.
Thus, there is no loss of optimality in restricting the candidate contractsC to those admissible
contracts for which EC(Xpi) = u0, for every C-optimal pi. This implies that we can drop
the expected payment to the agent in the principal’s objective and solve the relaxed problem:
find a random field pi∗ and the associated optimal wealth X∗ (with initial condition (X0, 0)),
s.t.
pi∗(X∗) ∈ argmaxE J(pi),
where the maximization is performed over all pi ∈ A(X0, 0). The main idea is to construct,
for a given pi∗, an admissible contract C, s.t. pi∗ is the only C-optimal strategy. Normalizing
C as in (6), we obtain the desired optimal contract.
Thus, the construction of an optimal contract reduces to solving the following inverse
problem: given a strategy pi∗ (viewed as a random field), find an admissible contract C, s.t.,
for any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ),
E
(
C(Xpi,ξ,τT ) | Fτ
)
≤ E
(
C(X∗,ξ,τT ) | Fτ
)
, a.s.,
and the equality is only possible if pi = pi∗(X∗,ξ,τ ) for a.e. (t, ω) in the stochastic interval
[τ, T ]. Fortunately, a solution to such problem is offered by the so-called forward perfor-
mance SPDE. In the remainder of this section, we describe this solution, given by a random
field (Ut(x))t≥0, x>0, and show that
C(x) = u0
UT (x)
U0(X0)
,
is the desired optimal contract.
3.1. Forward performance SPDE. Recall that the value function in the classical utility
maximization problem, at least formally, solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion. The following SPDE is an analog of the HJB equation in a non-Markovian case:
(7) dUt(x) =
1
2
‖∂xUt(x)λt + (σTt )+σTt ∂xat(x)‖2
∂2xxUt(x)
dt+ aTt (x)dWt, t ∈ [0, T ], x > 0,
where at(x) is a d-dimensional vector of progressively measurable random functions, con-
tinuously differentiable in x, which is referred to as the volatility of the forward performance
process. An application of Itoˆ-Ventzel formula proves the following fact (cf. [8], [15], [4],
[5]).
Proposition 1. Assume that a = (at(x))t∈[0,T ], x>0 and U = (Ut(x))t∈[0,T ], x>0, respectively,
are once and twice continuously differentiable stochastic flows (in the sense of [7]), satisfying
(7), and such that U is strictly concave in x (a.s. for all times). Then, the following holds.
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(1) For any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ), the process
(
Ut
(
Xpi,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a local
supermartingale (in the sense that there exists a localizing sequence that makes it a
supermartingale).5
(2) Assume that there exists a progressively measurable random field pi∗, satisfying a.s.,
for all t ∈ [0, T ],
(8) σtpi∗t (x) = −
λt∂xUt(x) + (σ
T
t )
+σTt ∂xat(x)
∂2xxUt(x)
, ∀x > 0,
and such that, for any initial condition (ξ, τ) ∈ X , there exists a unique (strong)
solution X∗,ξ,τ to
(9) dX∗,ξ,τt =
(
σtpi
∗
t (X
∗,ξ,τ
t )
)T
λtdt+
(
σtpi
∗
t (X
∗,ξ,τ
t )
)T
dWt, t ∈ [τ, T ], X∗,ξ,ττ = ξ.
Then,
(
Ut
(
X∗,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a local martingale.
(3) Assume that the conditions of the previous two items are satisfied, and that, in ad-
dition, the aforementioned local martingale and local supermartingales are a true
martingale and true supermartingales, respectively. Then, for any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and
any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ),
E
(
UT (X
∗,ξ,τ
T ) | Fτ
)
≥ E
(
UT (X
pi,ξ,τ
T ) | Fτ
)
a.s.,
and the equality is only possible if pi = pi∗(X∗,ξ,τ ) for a.e. (t, ω) in the stochastic
interval [τ, T ].
Proof:
As mentioned above, the proof of the theorem follows easily from an application of Itoˆ-
Ventzel formula to Ut(X
pi,ξ,τ
t ). A direct computation verifies the first two claims. For the
last claim, we only need to notice that the drift of Ut(X
pi,ξ,τ
t ) is strictly negative unless
pit = pi
∗(Xpi,ξ,τt ), with pi∗ given by (8). Then, taking conditional expectations, we obtain
the desired inequality.
The last item of the above theorem implies that pi∗(X∗) maximizes the criterion EUT (XpiT )
over all admissible strategies, provided it is, itself, admissible. Of course, to establish this,
one needs to (i) solve the SPDE (7), (ii) ensure the existence of pi∗ and X∗, and (iii) drop
“local” in the supermartignale and martingale properties. One way to ensure that the local
supermartingale (Ut (Xpit ))t≥0 is a true supermartingale, is to construct U so that inft,x Ut(x)
is bounded from below by an absolutely integrable random variable, and to restrict the initial
wealth to absolutely integrable random variables. Then, one can also show by a standard
5Throughout the paper, such process is always defined w.r.t. the filtration (Fτ∨t)t∈[0,T ], and its value on
[0, τ ] is Uτ (ξ).
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argument that the local martingale (Ut (X∗t ))t≥0 is a true martingale if and only if its expec-
tation at any time coincides with its initial value. Of course, there also exist other ways to
address (iii).
To address (i) and (ii), one needs to solve (7). However, the latter equation presents
numerous difficulties associated with its nonlinear nature and, even more importantly, with
the fact that it has “time running in a wrong direction” (cf. [9], for a more detailed discussion
of the latter issue). To date, there exist no existence or uniqueness results for the solutions
to (7) in its general form. Nevertheless, in the next subsection, we choose a specific form
of the volatility process a and show how to construct a unique solution to (7), for any given
(sufficiently regular) strategy pi∗, given as a random field. If, in addition, (iii) is resolved
and pi∗(X∗) is admissible, we obtain a solution to the optimal contract problem formulated
in Subsection 2.2. Indeed, if pi∗ is the optimal strategy of the principal (i.e. the strategy she
would like the agent to follow), the associated UT (x), normalized appropriately, produces
the desired optimal contract.
3.2. Solving the forward performance SPDE. Assume that we are given a random field
pi∗ : (R+ × Ω× (0,∞),P ⊗ B ((0,∞)))→ (R,B (R)) ,
where P is the sigma-algebra of progressively measurable sets. As usual, we suppress the
dependence upon ω ∈ Ω. We assume that pi∗ is a sufficiently smooth random field, with the
precise assumptions stated below. In this subsection, we construct a solution to (7), such that
(8) holds with the given pi∗.
Assume that U solves (7) and
(10) at(x) = a(t, x, Ut, ∂2xxUt) := at(x¯)− λt (Ut(x)− Ut(x¯))−
∫ x
x¯
σtpi
∗
t (y)∂
2
yyUt(y)dy,
where x¯ > 0 is a fixed constant, and (at(x¯))t≥0 is an arbitrary locally square integrable
process in Rd. With such a choice, we have:
(11) ∂xat(x) = −σtpi∗t (x)∂2xxUt(x)− ∂xUt(x)λt.
Then, recalling that the columns of σt are linearly independent, we obtain
(12) ∂xUt(x)λt + (σTt )
+σTt ∂xat(x) = −σtpi∗t (x)∂2xxUt(x),
and (7) becomes
dUt(x) =
1
2
‖σtpi∗t (x)‖2∂2xxUt(x)dt(13)
+
(
at(x¯)− λt (Ut(x)− Ut(x¯))−
∫ x
x¯
σtpi
∗
t (y)∂
2
yyUt(y)dy
)T
dWt
The following derivations (until Assumption 1) are heuristic and are meant to motivate the
main result of this subsection, Proposition 2. Introducing Vt(x) := ∂xUt(x), we, formally,
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differentiate the above equation, to obtain
dVt(x) =
1
2
∂x
(‖σtpi∗t (x)‖2∂xVt(x)) dt− (σtpi∗t (x)∂xVt(x) + λtVt(x))T dWt.(14)
Next, we introduce Rt(x) := −∂xVt(x) = −∂2xxUt(x), and, formally, differentiate the above
equation, to obtain
dRt(x) =
1
2
[
∂x
(‖σtpi∗t (x)‖2∂xRt(x))+ ∂x (‖σtpi∗t (x)‖2) ∂xRt(x)
+∂2xx
(‖σtpi∗t (x)‖2)Rt(x)] dt− [σtpi∗t (x)∂xRt(x) + (λt + σt∂xpi∗t (x))Rt(x)]T dWt,(15)
with the deterministic initial condition R0(x) = −∂2xxU0(x).
Assumption 1. Assume that, almost surely, for each t ≥ 0, the function pi∗t (·) is five times
continuously differentiable and
sup
z∈R
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1
σijt (∂z)
m
(
e−zpi∗jt (e
z)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξt, ∀m = 0, . . . , 5, i = 1, . . . , d,
for some progressively measurable stochastic process ξ with locally bounded paths.
For any function φ : R→ R, m-times weakly differentiable, we define the norm
‖φ‖m :=
(
m∑
j=0
∫
R
r2(z)
(
φ(j)(z)
)2
dz
)1/2
,
with
(16) r(z) := exp
(
η
√
1 + z2
)
,
with some constant η > 1. Following [6], we define the weighted Sobolev space Wm (con-
sisting of m-times weakly differentiable functions from R to R) as the closure of C∞0 (R) in
the ‖.‖m norm.
Assumption 2. Assume that U0 is strictly concave, ∂2xxU0(exp(·)), log(−∂2xxU0(exp(·))) ∈
W3, and that |λ| has locally integrable paths.
We now present one of the main results of this paper.
Proposition 2. Let pi∗, U0, σ, and λ, satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then, there exists a unique
random field R which solves (15), with the initial condition R0 = −∂2xxU0, and is such that
Rt(log ·) takes values in W3. The random field R·(·) is almost surely continuous and strictly
positive.
In addition, for any constant x¯ > 0 and any locally square integrable Rd-valued process
(at(x¯))t≥0, the random field (Ut(x))t≥0, x>0, given by
(17) Ut(x) = ζt +
∫ x
x¯
∫ ∞
y
Rt(z)dzdy,
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with
dζt = −1
2
‖σtpi∗t (x¯)‖2Rt(x¯)dt+ aTt (x¯)dWt, ζ0 = U0(x¯),
is strictly concave and strictly increasing in x, and satisfies (7), with the volatility a given by
(10). Moreover, for the given pi∗, (8) holds, and there exists a unique solution to (9), for any
(ξ, τ) ∈ X .
Proof:
First, we transform (15) with the simple change of variables, x = exp(z), introducing
R˜t(z) := Rt(e
z), and (15) becomes
dR˜t(z) =
1
2
[
(∂z + 1)
(
‖e−zσtpi∗t (ez)‖2∂zR˜t(z)
)
+ (∂z + 1)
(‖e−zσtpi∗t (ez)‖2) ∂zR˜t(z)
+(∂2zz + 3∂z + 2)
(‖e−zσtpi∗t (ez)‖2) R˜t(z)] dt(18)
−
[
e−zσtpi∗t (e
z)∂zR˜t(z) +
(
λt + (∂z + 1)
(
e−zσtpi∗t (e
z)
))
R˜t(z)
]T
dWt,
Notice that the SPDE (18) is linear and (degenerate) parabolic. In particular, it belongs to
the class of equations analyzed in [6]. Following this reference, we refer to Example 2.2
in [6], and the preceding discussion, to conclude that the conditions of Theorem 2.5 in [6]
are satisfied, with m = 3 and Γ = 1. The latter theorem states that there exists a unique
generalized solution R˜ to (18), with R˜0(z) = −∂2xxU0(ez), which is a progressively measur-
able process with values in W3, having continuous paths in W2. Notice that R˜t ∈ W3 im-
plies that R˜t(.) is twice continuously differentiable. Hence, the random field R˜·(·) is almost
surely continuous and strictly positive, and the spatial derivatives in (18) can be understood
in the classical sense. Then, changing the variables back to x = exp(z), we conclude that
Rt(x) := R˜t(log x) solves (15). Reverting these arguments, we obtain uniqueness of the
solution to (15).
Next, we show that R is strictly positive. Notice that it suffices to find a progressivley
measurable random field Y , such that exp(Y ) is a generalized solution to (18), with the
initial condition −∂2xxU0(ez). Then, from uniqueness, we conclude that R˜, and hence R, are
positive. To this end, we define Y as the unique generalized solution to the following SPDE
dYt(z) =
1
2
[
(∂z + 1)
(‖e−zσtpi∗t (ez)‖2∂zYt(z))− 2λTt e−zσtpi∗t (ez)∂zYt(z)
+(∂2zz + 3∂z + 2)‖e−zσtpi∗t (ez)‖2 − ‖λt + (∂z + 1)
(
e−zσtpi∗t (e
z)
) ‖2] dt(19)
− [e−zσtpi∗t (ez)∂zYt(z) + λt + (∂z + 1) (e−zσtpi∗t (ez))]T dWt,
with the initial condition
Y0(z) = log R˜0(z) = log(−∂2xxU0(ez)).
OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR A FUND MANAGER 13
Theorem 2.5 in [6] states that the above equation has a unique generalized solution. Applying
Itoˆ’s formula, we deduce that exp(Y ) solves (18), with the initial condition −∂2xxU0(ez).
The uniqueness of the solution implies exp(Y ) = R˜, hence, we conclude that R is strictly
positive.
Finally, we need to verify that the random field U , defined by (25), is well defined and has
the desired properties. To this end, we define
Vt(x) =
∫ ∞
x
Rt(y)dy.
Note that the above integral is well defined due to the choice of r (cf. (16)) and the fact that
R˜t = Rt(exp(·)) takes values in W3 ⊂W0:∫ ∞
x
Rt(y)dy =
∫ ∞
log x
ezR˜t(z)dz ≤
(∫ ∞
log x
r2(z)R˜2t (z)dz
)1/2(∫
log x
e2z−2η
√
1+z2dz
)1/2
<∞
Similarly, it is easy to deduce that ∂xRt(·) and ∂2xxRt(·) are absolutely integrable over (ε,∞),
for any ε > 0. Applying the stochastic Fubini theorem (cf. Theorem 64 in [11]), we integrate
(15) to deduce that V satisfies (14), with the initial condition V0(x) = ∂xU0(x).6 Applying
stchastic Fubini therem again, we integrate (14), to show that U , defined by (25), satisfies the
SPDE (13). It is clear that Ut(·) is strictly concave, as R is strictly positive. Then, choosing
at via (10), we conclude that U satisfies (7). In turn, equation (12) yields (8). Finally,
Assumption 1 implies that σtpi∗t (·) is globally Lipschitz, uniformly over (t, ω), which yields
the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (9), for any initial condition (ξ, τ) ∈ X .
Remark 6. Proposition 2 can be extended to hold with any positive weight function r, satis-
fying the condition (W˜ ) in [6], and such that∫ ∞
x
e2z
r2(z)
dz <∞, ∀x ∈ R.
Remark 7. It is straight-forward to formulate the version of Proposition 2 for the case
where the wealth variable x takes values in R (as opposed to being restricted to (0,∞)).
This would correspond to the investment problems in which the wealth is not restricted to
remain positive (cf. Remark 1). We did not find a unifying formulation that would allow us
to treat both cases (i.e. x ∈ R and x > 0) simultaneously, and we chose to consider the case
x > 0. This choice is motivated by the example in Section 4 which shows that, in the case
x > 0, in the Black-Scholes model, one can construct explicitly an optimal contract which
also satisfies the limited liability condition. Currently, we do not know how to ensure the
limited liability condition for the case x ∈ R, even in the context of this simple example.
Remark 8. An alternative description of the solutions to (7), using duality methods, is given
in [4], [5]. However, the present construction is much shorter and more direct, and it allows
6Strictly speaking, in order to apply Theorem 64 in [11], we need to localize R and pass to the limit in the
integrals over finite domain. We skip these routine arguments for the sake of brevity.
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us to obtain explicit solutions, as illustrated in Section 4. It is also worth mentioning that the
Markovian solutions to (7) are analyzed in [9].
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to establish the following characterization of an optimal
contract, which is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Consider any initial capital X0 > 0, as well as any λ and U0, satisfying As-
sumption 2 and such that U0(X0) > 0. Assume that there exists a progressively measurable
random field pi∗, such that pi∗ and σ satisfy Assumption 1, pi∗(X∗,X0,0) ∈ A(X0, 0), and
EJ(pi) ≤ EJ (pi∗) ,
for any pi that is C-optimal for some admissible contract C. Let U be defined as in Propo-
sition 2, with any constant x¯ > 0 and any locally square integrable Rd-valued process
(at(x¯))t≥0. Then, the following holds.
(1) For any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ), the process
(
Ut
(
Xpi,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a local
supermartingale.
(2) For any (ξ, τ) ∈ X , there exists a unique solution X∗,ξ,τ to (9), and the process(
Ut
(
X∗,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a local martingale.
(3) If the aforementioned local martingale and local supermartingales are a true mar-
tingale and true supermartingales, respectively, then,
C∗(x) := UT (x)
u0
U0(X0)
is an optimal contract.
Proof:
Proposition 2 implies that U , a, and pi∗, satisfy all the assumptions of Proposition 1. The
first two statements of the theorem follow immediately. To show the last statement, we notice
that the admissibility of pi∗(X∗), the integrability of C∗(Xpi), and the last part of Proposition
1, imply that C∗ is an admissible contract and that pi∗ is C∗-optimal. To conclude, consider
any admissible contract C and any C-optimal pi. Then, we have
E
[
J(pi)− C
(
Xpi,X0,0T
)]
≤ EJ(pi)− u0 ≤ EJ (pi∗)− u0 = E
[
J (pi∗)− C∗ (X∗,X0,0)] ,
where the first inequality follows from the admissibility of C and the C-optimality of pi, and
the second inequality follows from the assumptions of the theorem.
The next section illustrates the application of the above theorem. It describes a specific
market model and a concrete contract design problem, for which the present definition of
optimal contract is natural, and it shows how to construct an optimal contract explicitly.
Moreover, the resulting optimal contract satisfies the limited liability condition: C ≥ 0
(note, however, that this condition is not guaranteed by Theorem 1).
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4. EXPLICIT OPTIMAL CONTRACT IN THE BLACK-SCHOLES MODEL
In this section, we assume that d = k = 2, and
d log(S1t ) = (µ1 − σ21/2)dt+ σ1dW 1t ,
d log(S2t ) = (µ2 − σ22/2)dt+ σ2(ρdW 1t +
√
1− ρ2dW 2t ),
with some µ1, µ2 ∈ R, σ1, σ2 > 0, and ρ ∈ (−1, 1). In other words,
σ =
(
σ1 σ2ρ
0 σ2
√
1− ρ2
)
, µ =
(
µ1
µ2
)
, λ = (σT )−1µ =
(
µ1/σ1
µ2−(σ2ρµ1)/σ1
σ2
√
1−ρ2
)
.
Let us fix a constant γ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), whose meaning is explained below. We let
X consist of all pairs (ξ, τ), s.t. τ is any stopping time with values in [0, T ] and ξ, ξγ ∈
L1 ∩ L0+(Fτ ). For any (ξ, τ) ∈ X , we define A(ξ, τ) as the set of all locally integrable
processes pi, s.t. the resulting Xpi,ξ,τ is strictly positive and
E sup
t∈[τ,T ]
Xpi,ξ,τt + E sup
t∈[τ,T ]
(
Xpi,ξ,τt
)γ
<∞.
Next, consider an investor who is looking to hire an agent to manage her initial capital
X0. As discussed in the introduction, we assume that the contract between the agent and the
investor is designed by a third party, referred to as the principal (e.g., it can be a regulator, the
board of directors of a mutual fund, etc.). The principal chooses an optimal contract using
the following individual objective:
(20) J(pi) =
1
γ
(
Xpi,X0,0T
)γ
1{pi2≡0} −∞ · (1− 1{pi2≡0}),
where pi is a random field, and Xpi,X0,0 is generated by (3), with pi = pi
(
Xpi,X0,0
)
. The ra-
tionale behind this choice is as follows. The principal assumes (e.g., based on her estimates)
that a typical investor uses power utility, with the relative risk aversion 1−γ, and she adds the
constraint that no investment can be made in S2, as the latter asset is deemed inappropriate
(e.g., immoral, subject to sanctions, etc.).
Note that the investor may not be interested in the constraint pi2 ≡ 0 being met: e.g.,
in accordance with the assumption of the principal, she may aim to optimize the expected
power utility, without the constraint. After the contract is initiated, the investor may have an
opportunity to increase the size of her investment, at some stopping time τ , to a random level
ξ. As the investor may not care about the constraint pi2 ≡ 0, a priori, her capital injection
may encourage the agent to violate this constraint. Neither the principal nor the agent are
aware of the probabilistic properties of (ξ, τ) (i.e., we take the approach of Knightian uncer-
tainty with regards to the opportunities of capital injections). In particular, after any capital
injection (ξ, τ), the agent maximizes the expected value of the worst-case future scenario,
which corresponds to no future opportunities for capital injections (as she can always choose
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not to use such an opportunity). Thus, after every capital injection (ξ, τ) ∈ X , the agent
solves
max
pi∈A(ξ,τ)
E
(
C(Xpi,ξ,τT ) | Fτ
)
.
The regulator’s task is two-fold. First, she needs to ensure that the investor is as happy with
the contract as possible, given the constraint pi2 ≡ 0. Namely, the contract should be such
that every optimal strategy of the agent maximizes the expectation of (20) less the expected
payment to the agent, even in the presence of capital injections by the investor. Since these
injections are not known to the regulator, she aims to maximize the worst case scenario for
the investor, which is the case of no future opportunities for capital injections (as the investor
can always choose not to use such an opportunity). This leads to the following objective for
the regulator: find admissible contract C∗, s.t., for any C∗-optimal pi∗, (C∗, pi∗) maximizes
(21) E
[
J(pi)− C(Xpi,X0,0T )
]
among all pairs (C, pi) with admissible C and C-optimal pi. It is easy to see that, if C∗ is
an optimal contract, in the sense of Definition 2, then it solves the first task of the regulator.
The second task of the regulator is to ensure that the investor will not encourage the agent to
invest in the second asset by her capital injections. This task is resolved by the admissibility
property of an optimal contract C∗: cf. Definitions 1 and 2. Indeed, the admissibility implies
that, after each capital injection, it is still optimal for the agent to follow the optimal strategy
(understood as a random field) computed under the assumption of no capital injections. The
latter strategy does not invest in S2, as the pair (C∗, pi∗) maximizes the objective (21). In the
following subsections, we construct an optimal contract C∗ explicitly.
4.1. Principal’s optimal strategy. Following the solution approach outlined at the begin-
ning of Section 3, we, first, search for a random field pi∗1, s.t.
pi∗1(X∗) ∈ argmax 1
γ
E
(
Xpi,X0,0T
)γ
,
whereX∗ is the associated optimal wealth (starting fromX0 at time zero), and the supremum
is taken over all processes pi1, s.t. pi = (pi1, 0)T ∈ A(X0, 0). The wealth process, in this case,
satisfies
Xpi,X0,00 = X0 ∈ R, dXpi,X0,0s = pi1sσ1λ1ds+ pi1sσ1dW 1s , s ∈ [0, T ].
The solution to the above optimal investment problem is well known, but we briefly outline
it here, for the sake of completeness. The associated HJB equation for the value function V
is
∂tV + max
pi1
(pi1sσ1λ1∂xV +
1
2
(pi1)2σ21∂
2
xxV ) = 0, x > 0, t ∈ (0, T ), V (T, x) = xγ/γ.
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This yields
(22) V (t, x) =
xγ
γ
exp
(
(T − t) λ
2
1γ
2(1− γ)
)
, pi∗1t (x) =
λ1
σ1(1− γ)x,
(23) X∗0 = X0 > 0, dX
∗
s =
λ21
1− γX
∗
sds+
λ1
1− γX
∗
sdW
1
s , s ∈ [0, T ].
A standard verification argument shows that, indeed, V is the value function of the optimiza-
tion problem, pi∗1(X∗) is the optimal policy, and X∗ is the optimal wealth (note that X∗ is a
geometric Brownian motion, hence, pi∗(X∗) ∈ A(X0, 0)). In particular, it follows that
J(pi) ≤ J(pi∗),
for any pi that is C-optimal for some admissible contract C, with J given by (20).
4.2. Fake optimal contracts. Recall that the notion of optimal contract used herein (cf.
Definition 2) is stronger than usual. The main additional requirement of the present definition
is that the contract is robust w.r.t. capital shifts. In this subsection, we show how to construct
a (trivial) contract that does not possess this feature, to illustrate the differences.
Recall the optimal wealth process of the principal, X∗, given by (23), and consider the
following contract:
(24) Cˆ(x) := u01{X∗T }(x)
Note that, as long as X∗T is attainable from the current wealth level, the agent will always
aim for X∗T as the terminal wealth, according to such contract. From the non-degeneracy
of the market (i.e. the columns of σ are linearly independent), it follows that the agent will
keep following the prescribed strategy pi∗(X∗), given by (22), as this is the only strategy that
generates X∗T . As a result, the contract Cˆ leaves both the principal and the agent satisfied.
In fact, the above construction is well known in the optimal contract theory, and it always
works for the first-best (risk sharing) problems. However, the resulting contract Cˆ is not
robust with respect to capital injections. Indeed, if the current wealth level is perturbed, the
new set of attainable terminal wealth values may not include X∗T anymore. In this case, it
is not clear which strategy the agent will choose: in fact, in the case of a positive capital
injection, the contract will actually provide an incentive for the agent to “lose” (or steal)
funds (which, strictly speaking, is not allowed in the model, but can certainly happen in
practice). In particular, there is no guarantee that the agent will follow a strategy that is best
for the principal after a capital injection is made. One can modify the definition of the “fake”
optimal contract (24), by using functions other than indicator, and, e.g., obtain contracts that
are non-decreasing in the terminal wealth. Nevertheless, such modifications will not resolve
the main problem: the agent is not guaranteed to follow the prescribed strategy (viewed as a
random field) after a capital injection is made.
To conclude this subsection, we illustrate the importance of the fact that the individual
objective of the principal, J , given by (20), depends on the strategy pi in a more general
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way than through the terminal wealth XpiT alone. Recall that the principal needs to ensure
that the agent’s strategy satisfies the constraint pi2 ≡ 0 (this is what we call an endogenous
constraint). Then, if the principal’s individual objective were a deterministic function of
terminal wealth, e.g.,
J˜(Xpi) =
1
γ
(XpiT )
γ ,
we could maximize the expectation of this objective, to obtain an optimal strategy p˜i∗ (viewed
as a random field), and choose the contract
C˜(x) := J˜(x)
u0
E J˜(X∗T )
.
Note that E J˜(XpiT ) is indeed maximized by the desired optimal strategy pi∗. The dynamic
programming principle also implies that pi∗ (as a random field) remains optimal for the agent,
for any initial wealth level, and at any starting time. Thus, C˜ would be a (trivial) optimal
contract, in the sense of Definition 2. Nevertheless, this construction is only possible if the
individual objective of the principal depends on pi through XpiT only. Recall, however, that,
in the present formulation, J(pi) depends directly on pi, via the constraint pi2 ≡ 0. Hence,
if we use E (XpiT )
γ as the objective in the unconstrained problem, faced by the agent, it may
not yield the same optimal strategy pi∗. Indeed, the optimal contract constructed explicitly
in the next subsection does not coincide with the power function with exponent γ; in fact, it
becomes a random function of terminal wealth.
4.3. Optimal contract. Recall that pi∗t (x) = (pi∗1x, 0)T , with
pi∗1 =
λ1
σ1(1− γ) ,
maximizes the individual objective of the principal. Following Proposition 2 and Theorem
1, we start by solving the SPDE (15), which, in the present case, becomes
dRt(x) =
1
2
[
σ21(pi
∗1)2x2∂2xxRt(x) + 4σ
2
1(pi
∗1)2x∂xRt(x) + 2σ21(pi
∗1)2Rt(x)
]
dt
− [σ1pi∗1x∂xRt(x) + (λ1 + σ1pi∗1)Rt(x)] dW 1t − λ2Rt(x)dW 2t ,
With the ansatz Rt(x) = R(t, x,−W 1t ,−W 2t ), the above becomes
(∂tR +
1
2
∂2yyR +
1
2
∂2zzR)dt− ∂yRdW 1t − ∂zRdW 2t
=
1
2
[
σ21(pi
∗1)2x2∂2xxR + 4σ
2
1(pi
∗1)2x∂xR + 2σ21(pi
∗1)2R
]
dt
− [σ1pi∗1x∂xR + (λ1 + σ1pi∗1)R] dW 1t − λ2RdW 2t ,
which is equivalent to
∂tR +
1
2
∂2yyR +
1
2
∂2zzR =
1
2
σ21(pi
∗1)2x2∂2xxR + 2σ
2
1(pi
∗1)2x∂xR + σ21(pi
∗1)2R,
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∂yR = σ1pi
∗1x∂xR +
(
λ1 + σ1pi
∗1)R, ∂zR = λ2R.
The following specification solves the above system:
R(t, x, y, z) = R˜(t, σ1pi
∗1y + log x)e(λ1+σ1pi
∗1)y+λ2z,
∂tR˜ + A∂xR˜ + (A+B)R˜ = 0,
A :=
1
2
(
2λ1σ1pi
∗1 − σ21(pi∗1)2
)
, B :=
1
2
(
λ21 + λ
2
2
)
.
A specific solution to the above equation is given by
R˜(t, x) = exp (−(B − εA)t− (1 + ε)x) ,
R(t, x, y, z) = exp
(−(B − εA)t− (1 + ε) log x+ (λ1 − εσ1pi∗1) y + λ2z) ,
with any ε ∈ (0, 1). Then,
Rt(x) =
1
x1+ε
Qt,
where
Qt = exp
(−(B − εA)t− (λ1 − εσ1pi∗1)W 1t − λ2W 2t ) .
Let us fix any X∗0 > 0, and note that λ, σ, U0, and pi
∗, satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1.
To complete the construction, we choose x¯ = 1 and
a1t (x¯) = −
λ1 − εσ1pi∗1
ε(1− ε) Qt, a
2
t (x¯) = −
λ2
ε(1− ε)Qt,
to obtain
(25) Ut(x) = ζt+
∫ x
1
∫ ∞
y
Rt(z)dzdy = ζt+Qt
1
ε
∫ x
1
y−εdy = ζt+Qt
1
ε(1− ε)(x
1−ε−1),
with ζ0 = 1 and
dζt = −1
2
σ21(pi
∗1)2Qtdt− λ1 − εσ1pi
∗1
ε(1− ε) QtdW
1
t −
λ2
ε(1− ε)QtdW
2
t =
1
ε(1− ε)dQt.
Then
Ut(x) = Qt
1
ε(1− ε)x
1−ε, C∗(x) = u0
(
x
X0
)1−ε
QT .
Notice that such choice of ζ ensures that Ut(x) ≥ 0, for all x > 0 and all (t, ω), thus,
satisfying the limited liability condition. In addition, we can express Qt and, hence, Ut(x),
as deterministic functions of the returns of the two assets, S1 and S2, at time t:
W 1t =
1
σ1
log(S1t /S
1
0)− λ1t+
σ1
2
t,
W 2t =
1
σ2
√
1− ρ2 log(S
2
t /S
2
0)−
ρ
σ1
√
1− ρ2 log(S
1
t /S
1
0)+
(
σ2
2
√
1− ρ2 −
σ1ρ
2
√
1− ρ2 − λ2
)
t,
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Qt = exp
((
1
2
(λ21 + λ
2
2)− λ1
σ1
2
+ εpi∗1
σ21
2
(1− pi∗1)− λ2 σ2 − σ1ρ
2
√
1− ρ2
)
t
)
×
(
S1t
S10
)εpi∗1+ ρλ2
σ1
√
1−ρ2
−λ1
σ1
(
S2t
S20
)− λ2
σ2
√
1−ρ2
:= Q̂
(
t, S2t /S
2
0 , S
3
t /S
3
0
)
.
To conclude that C∗ is an optimal contract, it remains to verify that the assumptions of the
last statement of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Note that U ≥ 0. Part 1 of Theorem 1 implies
that, for any (ξ, τ) ∈ X and any pi ∈ A(ξ, τ), the process
(
Ut
(
Xpi,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a local
supermartingale. As it is nonnegative, and
Uτ (ξ) = const ·Qτ ξ1−ε ∈ L1,
(which follows form Ho¨lder inequality), an application of Fatou’s lemma yields that it is a
true supermartingale. Next, Part 2 of Theorem 1 implies that
(
Ut
(
X∗,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a local
martingale. As it is also positive, we have
E sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣Ut (X∗,ξ,τt )∣∣∣ ≤ const · E
(
ξ1−ε sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
Qt
(
X∗,1,τt
)1−ε))
<∞,
which follows, again, from Ho¨lder inequality, by observing that the expression inside the
supremum is a geometric Brownian motion. The above inequality implies that
(
Ut
(
X∗,ξ,τt
))
t∈[τ,T ]
is a true martingale and completes the proof of the fact that C∗ is an optimal contract (by
Theorem 1).
Notice that the optimal contract C∗ is given by a power function of terminal wealth mul-
tiplied by a random scalar. This is in contrast to the individual objective of the principal,
which is a deterministic function of terminal wealth. The random scalar, QT , itself, is a
power function of the returns generated by the two assets available in the market. Thus, ef-
fectively, the optimal contract measures the terminal wealth generated by the agent relative
to the performance of the available assets. Note also that the exponents in the latter power
functions depend on the characteristics of the assets, such as the market price of risk. Recall
also that the optimal contract is nonnegative, thus, satisfying the limited liability condition.
Note also that, as ε ≈ 0, the optimal contract converges to u0 multiplied by
x/X0
Q̂ (T, S2T/S
2
0 , S
3
T/S
3
0)
.
The above ratio measures the return of the fund relative to the returns of the two assets,
the latter being captured by Q̂. If this ratio exceeds one (i.e. if the fund outperformance
the benchmark), the manager’s fee exceeds its initially expected value u0 (i.e. he receives a
bonus). Otherwise, his payment drops below u0 (i.e. he is penalized).
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that the optimal contract C∗ is a deterministic function of
the terminal values of the wealth process and of the tradable assets. Hence, it also provides
a solution to the second-best (moral hazard) version of the problem, in which the principal
only observes (XpiT , S
1
T , S
2
T ) and, hence, cannot fully deduce the agent’s strategy pi from her
observations. This is not surprising, however, since the terminal value of the target optimal
wealth process, X∗T , is a deterministic function of (S
1
T , S
2
T ), which means that observing the
latter values is sufficient for the principal to enforce the desired trading strategy.
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